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TOURO LAW REVIEW
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Robbins v. Bright'36
(decided June 5, 1997)
Plaintiff, Gwendolyn Robbins, brought a negligence suit for
injuries she suffered when an automobile driven by her father
overturned after he fell asleep at the wheel. 37 The jury found for
the plaintiff and the defendants appealed.' Defendants were not
contesting liability, but rather the trial court's treatment of
plaintiffs refusal, due to her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's
Witness, to obtain a blood transfusion and mitigate her
damages.'39 Considering the involvement of plaintiff's right to the
free exercise of her religion which is protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution 4' and Article I § 3
of the New York State Constitution, 42 the trial court used a
"reasonable Jehovah's Witness" standard during the jury
instruction on Robbin's duty to mitigate her damages. 43
The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the
judgment of the lower court; holding that the trial court erred by
failing to explain to the jury the impact of plaintiffs religious
beliefs on her duty to mitigate damages, which, in essence,
directed the verdict to be based upon the validity of those
136 230 A.D.2d 548, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st Dep't 1997).
,37 Id. at 549-50, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
138 Id. at 550, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 551, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
141 U.S. CoNs'T. amend. I. This amendment provides in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... " Id.
142 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. This section provides in relevant part: "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all
mankind .... ." Id.
" Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 551, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
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beliefs.'" It is well-settled law in New York State that an injured
party is bound "to use reasonable and proper efforts to make the
damage as small as practicable""'4 and that a failure to do so will
reduce any damage award.14
As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered both hip and knee
damage. 47 At trial, plaintiff's expert testified that if plaintiff did
not have surgery, she would be confined to a wheelchair as a
result of "necrotic development in the bone structure of [the
affected] limbs."'"1 All the experts agreed, however, that surgery
would offer plaintiff the "prospect of a good recovery and a near
normal life." 49  Plaintiff presented proof, primarily from her
hospital records, that she refused the surgery because her
religious beliefs, as a Jehovah's Witness, prevented her from
having the blood transfusions that surgery would require.-
Reflecting New York law, the New York pattern jury
instruction concerning damage mitigation refers to the actions of
"a reasonably prudent person"' and gauges the duty to mitigate
by that standard.ln Although the lower court mentioned the
'"4Id. at 553-54, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
145 Id. at 550, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12 (quoting Blate v. Third Ave. R.R.
Co., 44 A.D. 163, 167, 60 N.Y.S. 732, 734 (1st Dep't 1899)).
146 Id. at 550, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (citing Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y.
72, 77 (1863)).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149Id.
I1 Id. at 551, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
m N.Y. PH! § 2:325 (1996). This section provides in pertinent part:
A person who has been injured is not permitted to recover
for damages that could have been avoided by using means
which a reasonably prudent person would have used to (cure
the injury, alleviate the pain) .... If you find that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, then in deciding
the nature and permanence of (his, her) injury and what
damages (he, she) may recover for the injury, you must
decide whether in refusing to have an operation the plaintiff
acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under
the circumstances.
Id.
15 Id.
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"reasonably prudent person" standard to the jury, the court
charged the jury with a "reasonable Jehovah's Witness"' 3
standard concerning plaintiffs duty to mitigate her damages. 154
In reaching its holding, the First Department began its analysis
by noting that the trial court, in adopting the "reasonably prudent
Jehovah's Witness" standard, sought to protect plaintiff's basic
right to the free exercise of her religious beliefs as guaranteed by
the Federal and New York State Constitutions.'55 The First
Amendment also provides that any law "respecting an
establishment of religion," is invalid.'56 The court determined
that the trial court therefore erred when it instructed the jury on
the issue of plaintiff's refusal to have surgery." 7 According to its
jury instruction, the trial court allowed the jury to give total
deference to plaintiffs religious beliefs so as not to unlawfully
restrain the free exercise of her faith. 5' Such deference to
religion is exactly the type of "preference" prohibited by the
First Amendment. 59
The Appellate Division explained that the trial court made its
first error when it perceived the issue as a question of whether
"I Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 551, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (quoting Williams v.
Bright, 167 Misc. 2d 312, 317, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1995)). The New York County, Supreme Court charged the jury in
the following manner:
You have to accept as a given that the dictates of her religion
forbid blood transfusions. And so you have to
determine ... whether she ... acted reasonably as a
Jehovah's Witness in refusing surgery which would involve
blood transfusions. Was it reasonable for her, not what you
would do -- or your friends or family -- was it reasonable for
her, given her beliefs, without questioning the validity or the
propriety of her beliefs?
Id. (emphasis in original).
4 Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 551, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
155 Id.
156 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984).
157 Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 551, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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any jury verdict could conflict with plaintiffs "religious belief
that it may be better to suffer present pain than to be barred from
entering the Kingdom of Heaven." 10 The court noted that neither
the State nor anyone else has the right to interfere with someone's
religious beliefs. 6' However, the real issue in the present case is
whether the consequences of such a belief should be paid for by
someone other than the plaintiff.1'2
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,11 a state
may only impose a substantial burden on a person's right to
freely exercise his/her religion in the presence of a "compelling
interest."'" The court noted that the state has a "compelling
interest" in assuring that judicial proceedings are fairly decided
and that no litigant is "improperly advantaged or disadvantaged"
by an adherence to a particular set of religious beliefs.10 Because
an order originating from a state court constitutes "state action,"
the court noted that, under the Fourteenth Amendment,16 the state
160 Id. at 552, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13 (quoting Williams v. Bright, 167
Misc. 2d 312, 318, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995)).
161 Id. at 552, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
16 Id.
163 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a)(b) (1993) (repealed by City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct (1997)). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except... if it demonstrates that the
application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
Id.
'Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 553, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 913. See also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the state could not require
Amish children to attend public school in violation of their religious beliefs);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (finding no compelling state
interest when Sabbath observer's unemployment benefits were denied because
she refused to work on the Sabbath).
'6 Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 553, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in relevant part:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." Id. In addition, the New York State Constitution
1998 1029
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also has an additional interest - to provide equal protection to
every individual that comes before its courts.167
The court continued its analysis by noting that a state may not
give its approval to any particular religion or any set religious
practice' 1 and that by accepting plaintiff's beliefs without
question, the trial court, in essence, granted governmental
endorsement to those beliefs. 16
Because the courts of this country have "no business"
endorsing or condemning anyone's religious beliefs, the court
contended that the lower court entered into a "forbidden
domain." 17  The court noted that the trial court entered the
"forbidden domain," under the three-pronged formula of Lemon
v. Kurtzman,171 when it decided the "reasonable practice" of
provides in relevant part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
'
67Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 553, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
'6' Id. at 554, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)).
169 Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 553, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
170 Id. (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944)). In
Ballard, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious
belief,... embraces the right to maintain theories of life and
of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to
followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to
our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines
or beliefs .... [I]f those doctrines are subject to trial before
a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the
same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.
When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a
forbidden domain. The First Amendment does not select any
one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position.
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
114 (1943).
' Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 555, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). The Lemon Court found no
constitutional violation if the state action in question has a non-religious
legislative purpose, the main effect of which does not enhance nor inhibit
1030 [Vol 14
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Jehovah's Witnesses.'7 Once the trial court decided the damage
mitigation issue with total deference to plaintiffs beliefs, the
court became "excessively entangled" in religious matters.'"
The court then used the case of Lundman v. McKowan17' to
illustrate an excursion into the "forbidden domain."175 The
Appellate Division explained that the court in Lundman, by
undertaking an evaluation of different practices and tenets of the
Christian Scientist faith, chose to proceed into the "forbidden
domain" 76 that Justice Douglas so admonished against.'"
In reversing the judgment in part and remanding on the issue of
damages only, the court held that the pattern jury instruction must
be supplemented by what is called a "reasonable believer"
charge.7  The court stated that the application of this additional
religion, and the [action] does not cause the state to become excessively
entangled with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
172Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 554, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
" Id. See Kirk v. Cisler, 244 A.D. 733, 733-34 (2d Dep't 1935)
(admonishing the lower court for allowing the beliefs of the Christian Science
religion "to creep into the trial" in such a way that invited prejudice to the
plaintiff's advantage).
174 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). In Lundman, a wrongful death
action was brought on behalf of a young Christian Scientist boy who had died
of juvenile onset diabetes. Id. at 813. The young boy's caretakers
consistently failed to seek medical assistance in the three days prior to the
youth's death relying instead on Christian Science prayer. Id. at 828. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the proper standard of care would be
whether, given the facts in this case, a "reasonable person - who is a good
faith Christian Scientist" would have done the same under similar
circumstances. Id.
75Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 554, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
176 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
'77Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 556, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16.
178 Id. at 556-57, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16. The court instructed the trial
court to supplement the jury charge with the following instruction:
In considering whether the plaintiff acted as a reasonably
prudent person, you may consider the plaintiff's testimony
that she is a believer in the Jehovah's Witness faith,
and... that... she cannot accept any medical treatment
which requires a blood transfusion. I charge you that such
belief is a factor for you to consider, together with all the
other evidence you have heard, in determining whether the
1998 1031
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 3, Art. 32
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/32
TOURO LAWREVIEW
charge is intended to fairly balance the competing interests of the
parties involved in the litigation. 
79
In the dissent,'80 Justice Rosenberger reasoned that the jury
instruction met the state's interest in minimizing damages, under
tort law, to those reasonably incurred without placing an
excessive burden placed on plaintiffs religious beliefs.'8 ' This
charge, the dissent noted, did not take the issue of plaintiff's
reasonableness away from the jury.2 Because the majority
wanted to have the jury hear evidence to determine whether
plaintiff's refusal to have the blood transfusion was reasonable,
the dissent contended that this crossed impermissible boundaries
plaintiff acted reasonably in caring for her injuries, keeping
in mind, however, that the overriding test is whether the
plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person, under all the
circumstances confronting her.
Id.
179 Id. at 557, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
180 Id. at 558, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 559, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting). The trial
court's jury charge stated:
Now, in making your determination as to whether [plaintiff]
has acted reasonably to mitigate damage, I will instruct you
that under no circumstances are you to consider the validity
or reasonableness of her religious beliefs ... we cannot have
a situation in which jurors in passing on the reasonableness
of somebody's conduct, pass upon whether their religious
beliefs are reasonable or nor reasonable. What is reasonable
for [an] adherent of one religion may appear totally
unreasonable to someone who has different beliefs, but you
may not pass upon the validity of anyone else's beliefs. That
is out of bounds for you. You have to accept as a given that
the dictates of her religion forbid blood transfusions.
And so you have to determine in assessing the question of
damages ... whether she, Mrs. Robbins, acted reasonably
as a Jehovah's Witness in refusing surgery which would
involve blood transfusions. Was it reasonable for her, not
what you would do or your friends or family, was it
reasonable for her given her beliefs, without questioning the
validity or propriety of her beliefs.
Id. at 559-60, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting) (quoting
Williams v. Bright, 167 Misc.2d at 317, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 763-64).
182 Id. at 560, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
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and that plaintiff must not be "subjected to the intrusiveness and
indignity" of having the jury determine the reasonableness of her
religious beliefs.'
The Federal and New York State Constitutions, though not
identical in words, are identical in substance concerning the free
exercise of religion. As both constitutions mandate the free
exercise of religion without discrimination or preference,' the
Appellate Division, First Department, held that it was error to
introduce instructions concerning the validity of religious
doctrines."
183 Id. at 560-63, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
' See U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
18 Robbins, 230 A.D.2d at 556, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 915 (Rosenberger, J..
dissenting).
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